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Abstract—Internet of Things paradigm enables computation 
and communication in tools that every day everyone uses.  The 
vastness and heterogeneity of devices and the ways they are 
composed to offer innovative services and scenarios require a 
challenging vison in interoperability, security and in managing 
huge quantity of data. Many IoT frameworks and platforms 
propose to solve these issues, aggregating different sources of 
information and combine their flow of data in innovative 
services. Due to the potentially very sensible nature of some of 
this data, privacy and security aspects have to be taken into 
account by design and by default. An end-to-end secure solution 
has to permit the final users to have full control on their personal 
data and, on the other side, the framework has to support 
developers in writing applications offering the highest level of 
security/protection on their data flow. European Commission 
GDPR also added complexity to this context. In this paper, 
Snap4City solution to support such level of privacy and security 
in an IoT scenarios is presented. Snap4City has been developed 
in the context of Select4Cities PCP project of the European 
Commission. 
Keywords— IoT, smart city, security, end-2-end, GDPR. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things (IoT) could become a disruptive 
technology in the very close future, especially for citizens 
living in big metropolitan areas: the pervasiveness of the 
electronic IoT Devices, integrated in common “goods” people 
use every day (pens, tables, fridges or cars), is becoming 
deeper and deeper. In the future, the available addresses’ space 
for these devices will be wide to be able to point to any sensors 
of any devices at any moment without (theoretically) no 
restrictions or constraints. Recent products that implements 
Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWAN) technologies for 
IoT introduced by Sigfox and Semtech (LoRa) have been 
gaining interest and have been under intense research and 
deployment campaigns worldwide [1]. At the same time, short 
range IoT commercial devices (based on technologies such as 
IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth Low Energy [2]) are sold in 
increasing quantities and are already able to support scenario 
for smart homes, cities and industrial automation. Moreover, 
the start of the commercialization of 5G devices and services 
are creating high expectation in networking new technologies, 
as killer application of previous technologies in metropolitan 
areas [3]. 
A wide variety of objects (e.g., smart bulbs, IP cameras, 
alarm clocks, buttons) are already today part of the user’s 
environment, relaying on house’s modem and hub devices to 
connect them over the network. The IoT infrastructures permit 
to realize a more integrated scenario where real world and 
smart devices complete each other and permit management 
with less human intervention: open communication schema 
supporting different standard protocols (e.g., MQTT over 
TLS) enable devices to connect each other and to exploit 
cloud-fog infrastructures [4]. The support, usually provided 
by IoT frameworks, entails to identify a structure which 
coordinates and controls processes conducted by several 
different IoT elements. These frameworks are a set of 
modules, rules, algorithms that organize the ways in which 
data are exchanged, processed and managed among all 
involved parties (devices, users, cloud, containers, edges). 
Even more, it supports the implementation of IoT applications 
that permits definition of user-component-logic, hiding at the 
same time the complexity of the infrastructure [5]. 
The architecture model of these IoT platforms must to be 
taken strongly in consideration, due to the huge amount of the 
data exchanged among parties and the complexity and the 
heterogeneity of the protocols and devices involved [6]. The 
information sent/received by the IoT devices could carry very 
sensible and private information; therefore, protection and 
cryptography techniques should be exploited and diffusely 
implemented. All steps of a secure communication must be 
guarantee as well as how the data are recorded and managed 
during all the cycle-life, from sensing, to injection, to consume 
for data analysis, to visualization [7]. In this context, the 
design of a flexible architecture is required to support the users 
to delegate the computation of personal data in a safe 
environment [8]. High level of security has to be assured in 
scenarios where the users completely rely on the system 
managing their data, that can be eventually exploited to help-
inform-assist the data owner in daily activities and tasks, in a 
modern context with huge information overload [9]. 
The complexity of the IoT architectures makes hard to 
offer the needed level of security: the computation is 
becoming more and more world wide distributed among peers 
and not anymore centralized in a controlled static environment 
or cloud data center. The necessity to support heterogeneous 
source of information (IoT devices and sensors), accessed in 
a multitude of different ways using various communication 
systems, bringing another level of complexity, in scenario 
where it is difficult to predict when and where the data are 
generated and made available (ingested) to the 
system/subsystems [10]. Lacking regulations and 
certifications for devices and sensors as such as for the 
complete IoT infrastructure leaves to closed systems the 
ability to lobbing on proprietary solution. 
In section II, the major requirements needed for a robust 
IoT platforms are listed. In section III, the Snap4City solution 
is presented, with some introduction on the architecture and 
focusing on aspects of users’ data privacy and security. In 
section IV, conclusions to the problems highlighted and 
solved by Snap4City solution are draw. 
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II. REQUIREMENTS 
The list of requirements an IoT platform has to satisfy in 
term of privacy and security can be long and endless. The 
major issues identified in design of Snap4City solution are 
reported as follows. 
• the platform has to manage the data as sensible data by 
default (both single elements and data sets, time series, 
etc.). Data can be explicitly linked to the users or to users’ 
devices. It has to be possible to specify the time’s interval 
for which the data have to be stored, or if that is not 
possible, the criteria used to determine this interval; 
• the platform has to request explicit consent to any of the 
data/dataset identified above. “Informed consent by 
default” in no valid anymore in Europe according to 
GDPR. The platform has to provide clear information 
about each data/dataset license (e.g., how long and 
eventually how it can be shared to third parties, such as 
users, groups, organizations); 
• the platform has to provide the user the “right to access” 
and “right to be forgotten”. A user must be able to fully 
manage own data and eventually requiring the erasure of 
them. The platform has to permit access on data by law 
enforcement agencies/police, for a specific limited time 
interval; 
• the platform has to provide the users the “right to review” 
(auditing). It should be possible for the users to check 
the consents provided and about how automated 
decisions are computed on personal data collected. The 
user has to be able to review the complete log of the 
accesses made on private data (when, why, who request 
data); 
• the platform has to implement methods of data breach 
detection to disclose in a short period whenever some 
data has been tampered or leaked; 
• the platform has to support data protection (privacy and 
security) by design and by default, requiring controls built 
into products and services from the earliest stage; 
• the platform has to provide a way to define roles and 
responsibilities within organizations to permit different 
level of user’s credentials; the platform has to implement 
appropriate technical and organization measures to 
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, 
including, and not limited to pseudo-anonymization, 
confidentiality and integrity, availability, resilience, 
disaster recovery, periodic stress testing and workload; 
• the platform has to provide a system for unique entity 
management, authentication and authorization. Just 
the user that is authorized can access its private data and 
eventually, if a user has provided a consent to another 
user/process/entity, it should be possible to enforce this 
access;  
• the platform has to store the data in an encrypted way, to 
prevent in the event of breach, the identification of any 
specific individual compromised data; 
• the platform should support accounting in terms of 
reporting resource consumption and billing, if any; 
• the platform has to assure a tolerable security level even 
for device with constrained resources (energy 
consumption and memory availability) and belonging to 
different hardware specification (e.g., microcontroller, 
microprocessors, personal computer, mobile devices). 
The platform has to provide a different level of security 
based on the different level of sensitivity of the carried 
data; 
• the platform has to avoid exposing a single point of 
failure; 
• the platform must support protection of data in any 
possible different configuration it can be deployed: 
local computation, on-cloud scenario, mixed between 
local and cloud (the stack IoT Device, IoT edge, IoT app 
on cloud, dashboards, etc.), sensor’s data retrieved in 
push, pull, real-time, etc. 
Beside the security aspects, it is important to keep in mind 
more general requirements valid for any IoT architecture: 
• Cloud-Fog data routing and local (on premise) IoT 
computation on IoT edge; 
• Abstraction of IoT brokers and devices with support 
provided by IoT Directory and Knowledge Base; 
• Device Shadowing and management (IoT data 
storage); heterogeneous in/out sensors-actuators; 
• Programming and data analytics abstraction, 
exploiting IoT data and historical contextual data; 
• Scalability and cloud service for Context Brokers, IoT 
devices, Container, IoT Applications; 
• Dashboards and data presentation, business 
intelligence, visual analytics (Web-Socket support);  
III. ARCHITECTURE 
The Snap4City architecture has been designed and 
implemented using principles depicted above by the Cloud-
Fog IoT architectures, decoupling IoT edge functionalities 
(functionality directly accessed on the user premise) from the 
core platform services. The architecture is flexible enough to 
support the above requirements which are valid for a wide 
range of IoT use cases with for local computation, cloud 
computation and mixed. In Snap4City, the set of tools are able 
to guarantee the privacy and protection of the data managed 
by the system are enforced in main architecture (in respect 
mainly to the GDPR, the ENOLL and the Select4Cities set of 
recommendations). 
Fig.1. Snap4City main architecture 
From the upper left part of Figure 1, the system permits 
the user to access the platform with a set of devices via a User 
Interface and via a set of conformant mobile applications. The 
user accesses the platform functionalities in an authenticated 
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way using its credentials. His identity, whenever verified, is 
propagated by the SSO Login module towards any Snap4City 
module that need to access some user’s data. The users’ 
characteristics (mandatory and optional information about the 
user) are kept in a separate storage called User Registry. The 
platform is interfaced to the real world via a set of IoT 
Devices, sensors and actuators. A multitude of different 
devices are supported: simple IoT devices based on 
microchips (e.g., the esp8266 with microcontroller 
capabilities);  more powerful devices based on small single 
board computers (e.g., Raspberry PI) with better capabilities 
that can be configured with sensors/actuators onboard to act 
as aggregator of other IoT devices on their premise (playing 
the role of an IoT Edge) or as router towards the Snap4City 
backbone (IoT Gateway); handheld personal computer (e.g., 
Android on smartphones or similar devices) with embedded 
strong network capabilities; any personal computer and 
Internet devices; preconfigured virtual device created directly 
on the cloud infrastructure. 
Any of the supported IoT devices can communicate 
directly to the platform whenever they have an Internet 
communication. Otherwise, they can eventually be configured 
to be connected with the Snap4City backbone using an 
aggregator/distributor device (IoT Edge) connected for 
example via a wireless network interface towards an Internet 
access point using standard communication capabilities (IEEE 
802.x) or other private/patented technologies (LoRa, SigFox, 
RS485, ModBUS, BLE). 
The IoT Edge can be also configured to dispatch the 
message locally towards a set of IoT Applications installed 
directly on the premise of the user’s IoT Devices. The idea is 
to enable Fog computation completely decoupled from the 
Snap4City backbone. With this kind of configuration, the data 
can be elaborated and presented locally (in terms of closeness 
to the installed IoT Device and IoT Edge) via a set of 
Dashboards, created by the user via platform’s tools, and 
instantiated locally on devices on their premises. In some case 
these IoT Applications can make use of External Services 
provided by a set of MicroServices exposed by the platform: 
they are accessed remotely via Internet connection and clearly 
in case the connectivity is not available or guarantee, the 
application logic has to treat this kind of information 
according to a backup ad-hoc solution. The MicroServices are 
implemented using the Smart City API [11] that work 
directly on top of a Km4City based Knowledge Base (KB) 
and a Data Shadowing system. A set of additional tools are 
also available; for simplicity here just two main macro-blocks 
are presented: the analytics set of tools and the scheduling 
functionality. The KB of the microservices is kept updated in 
real-time via the injection of static and real time data 
retrieved by a set of ETL processes, scheduled in a proper way 
basing on the nature and the dynamicity of the same data.  
In most of the IoT cloud solutions, the data flows to/from 
a set of IOT Brokers (Mosquito MQTT, Orion NSGI, etc.) to 
enable a shadowing system. In front of the Context Brokers an 
IoT Firewall enables the access just to granted device/entities. 
The data collected are stored in repositories and made 
available to the other internal components of the Snap4City 
solution, mainly to the IoT Applications deployed on cloud. 
The IoT Applications (based on Node-RED plus Snap4City 
library of nodes for Smart City) permit the users to design in 
an easy graphical way an ad-hoc application logic that 
manages data and provides applicative users interface via the 
Dashboard components. These Dashboard nodes of IOT 
Applications allow at the final user to compose in an intuitive 
way IoT App visual interface (input and output) by using a list 
of widgets that can be defined on top of raw or structured data, 
for full user interaction including virtual sensors and actuators. 
The IoT Context Brokers are registered and managed by 
an IoT Directory: a module to manage the IoT Device’s 
registry and associate the user credentials to IoT Device, so as 
the access can be granted. Different levels/kinds of credentials 
are available (key credentials, certificate credentials) and are 
specified whenever a new device is registered by the user in 
the Snap4City IOT Directory. The data carried by the IoT 
Device can also flow directly to IoT Applications. Any IoT 
Device, sensor and actuator, Dashboard and IoT Application 
whenever instantiated/created are associated with an owner. 
Therefore, any Snap4City module can enable/deny access to 
specific user/group/organization, which can be the recipient of 
a delegation/right. The Ownership module has to be acceded 
in an authenticated way to provide access information. Beside 
the concept of ownership, the mechanism of Delegation 
(consent) is also implemented to permit users to delegate other 
users, or groups/organizations, to access to their private 
entities (data, values from sensors, dashboards). A user can 
also make public some of entities, creating a special 
“Delegation to Anyone” in an anonymous form, to give access 
to any users to data/resources, without revealing himself. The 
information of the ownership and the delegations, beside any 
other personal data a user like to keep in a private and secure 
storage are managed by the MyPersonalData module, where 
data are managed/stored in a protected way, in conformance 
to the GDPR. Any personal’s data is labelled using a general 
classification (motivation, variable name, variable value, 
variable unit). Therefore, developers can create their own data 
sets and eventually display them with Dashboard Widgets. 
Beside the personal data, the Key Performance Indicator 
manager (KPI) is also available, in order to manage ad-hoc 
time series and enrich them with more structured metadata 
(GPS location, healthiness, …). 
The way sensors and actuators are connected to the 
Snap4City backbone and which IoT Infrastructure’s services 
are involved strongly depends on the use case scenario to 
implement, on the energy and connectivity available around 
the sensors and on the level of security required (sensibility of 
the transmitted data). The Snap4City IoT cloud infrastructure 
is the backbone of the solution. It is completely virtualized and 
acts as the boilerplate where City Operators configure, via a 
set of graphical tools, processes for data aggregation and data 
analytics. The data generated by IoT Applications can be also 
injected back in the internal Knowledge Base and exposed to 
3rd party modules/dashboards for graphical presentation or for 
further analysis, keeping in mind that just the data owner or 
delegated users will be enabled to access them. 
A. User Access Security 
The Snap4City solution uses several tools for 
authentication and authorization enforcement and 
users/entities access to platform resources (see Figure 2). The 
users’ registry is partially managed by a distributed 
directory information service (LDAP) and partially 
maintained in a customer-relationship management (CRM, 
Drupal). Mandatory information is saved in LDAP and is 
composed by usernames, hashed version of the users’ 
password, emails, roles and organizations/groups affiliations, 
... The username is the primary key to identify the users in the 
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Snap4City platform; the role (Manager, AreaManager, 
ToolAdmin and RootAdmin) is used to classify the users 
regarding their level of trust and to enable different level of 
details to access the Snap4City functionalities (e.g., enable 
different views of the interface, permits more or less data 
investigation). Moreover, some tools may be accessed by not 
registered users. The organization/group information is used 
to organize the users in term of location or purpose (for 
organization, e.g., Firenze, Helsinki, Antwerp) and affiliation 
(for group, e.g., Developer, Services, General Management). 
The LDAP module is disconnected from the Internet and is 
reachable just from an internal subnetwork proper 
configurated.  
Optional information regarding the user is saved in the 
CRM and includes names and surnames, registration and last 
access dates, locations in term of residency’s country and its 
time-zones. Any of this information is pseudo anonymized 
with technique as specified below. 
Fig.2. Snap4City identity management and authentication/authorization 
Via the CRM Web Interface, the user can register into  
Snap4City ecosystem specifying a username, a valid e-mail 
address and his password. The users can anytime review and 
update his information and eventually remove completely his 
account. A CRM plugin permits to keep synchronized the 
user’s information with the LDAP module. The CRM is 
installed on a Debian Virtual Machine accessible from the 
Internet through an TLS/SSL entry point with a proper signed 
certificate and is kept updated and live monitored.  
The user authentication is enforced using a Single Sign-
on (SSo) system and an Identity Management functionality 
(Keycloak). The users’ registry is kept synchronized with a 
LDAP module and uses the OpenIDConnect protocol to 
provide a users’ authentication system to any Snap4City 
modules (which include also the CRM module). Anytime a 
user tries to access at a resource exposed by a Snap4City 
module, when the user is not already logged, the request is 
forwarded to the SSO Server that requires to the user to 
specify his credentials. Whenever there is a match to the 
credentials stored in the LDAP users’ register, the user is 
eventually granted to access the resource exposed by the 
Snap4City module (depending on ad-hoc additional 
enforcement provided by the modules): the user’s role 
specified in LDAP is  mapped in the  SSO rules’ registry, so 
the system administrator can specify in detail particular access 
rule to enable or deny access (specification of grants) to 
specific user’s role to specific Snap4City modules. During the 
authentication phase of the user, Keycloak passes to the 
contacted Snap4City modules, beside their usernames, also 
their roles; thus, whenever the user is granted to access a 
specific module, the module itself can implement internally 
another finer ad-hoc authorization’s rule to eventually 
permits/denies the requested resource/functionality. The 
module could also contact the LDAP to directly retrieve the 
organizations/groups the user belongs and the 
Ownership/Delegation Snap4City module to enable a 
transversal authorization schema. 
Any communications between the Snap4City modules is 
made on top of the SSL/TLS protocol, thus transmission is 
kept confidential and a system of temporary shared secrets, 
represented in the form of an access token (in this solution a 
JWT -JSON WebToken- is used), permits a SSO system 
among the different modules. When the user accesses a 
resource from a module in an interactive manner via a Web 
interface, whenever a JWT is not present or not valid (elapsed, 
tempered or not correctly digital signed), the user is always 
redirected to the login Web page. The Keycloak is configured 
to provide authentication via the OpenIDConnect protocol, so 
the OAuth 2.0 protocols is involved for the authentication part 
enriched on top with the user’s identification part.  
In IOT connections and when Machine to Machine 
connections are needed, an entity (like an external 
machine/device) need to access a Snap4City module in a 
programmatic manner, a formal user is still needed to specify 
credentials as above. In those cases, an offline-access token is 
released (refresh token), and the machine does not need to 
request the user to login anymore and can use this refresh 
token to request a normal access token as specified above. 
This refresh offline token has a longer-live time so human 
interaction is limited. Once the authentication and 
identification of the user is successfully completed (and a 
valid access token is returned), the Snap4City modules are 
contacted attaching the JWT as their credentials. They will be 
used to validate if the user/machine has enough rights to 
access the requested data/resource.  
The OpenIDConnect protocols enables the separation of 
entry points and communications for the different Snap4City 
modules to authenticate the users, even if the shared JWT can 
enable the access to different modules. This configuration 
permits a nice user experience, enabling at the same time the 
possibility of creating a detailed auditing on the user access 
modality and frequency. Moreover, the secret the different 
Snap4City modules need to specify to access the SSO server 
for user’s authentication are specific to any module, thus, in 
case of leaking or intrusion by a malicious user, the problem 
can be isolated without the need of a complete system 
reconfiguration, and without exposing a single point of failure. 
B. Network Access Protection 
In order to enable access from/to IoT Devices (and its 
related sensors and actuators), a user has to register the device 
into the Snap4City ecosystem. Thus, any communication 
between the device and the platform can be made in a 
protected and authenticated manners. The registration is made 
using a Snap4City module called IoT Directory: it exposes a 
Web Interface to the user that has to be authenticated and 
authorized as described in the previous section. For 
registration, the user specifies several information regarding 
its device as unique identifier, type/manufactory, location to 
be chosen on a map and the endpoint broker (chosen by a set 
of possible registered configurations). In case the number of 
the devices to be register is massive, the user can use a 
functionality that automatically register (in a background 
modality) a large set of devices via a detailed csv file 
containing all the needed information (Bulk Registration). A 
device can be registered using a pre-compiled template (model 
of the device), by using automatically filled forms: the model 
and the device type also influence the level of the protection 
1374
the platform can guarantee for this particular hardware/device. 
The Snap4City framework supports different authentication 
schemas for different kind of IoT Devices and level of 
protection, including proprietary solution beside open-
standard ones as described in the following.  
For the proprietary solution, the data flow and the 
authentication systems are completely demanded to their 
proprietary infrastructure. In this case, the IoT Device sends 
the sensor’s data directly to their proprietary Context Broker 
in their supported protected way (e.g., for Sigfox 
configuration, it relies on credentials K1, K2), meanwhile the 
Snap4City platform is configured to retrieve the data (in pull-
up modality, on demand) in a second moment, whenever the 
user specifies the needed credentials for the proprietary 
solution. Also push modality can be used from SigFOX. The 
data injected in the Snap4City solution is labelled with the 
name of the IoT Device owner that generate data and are 
managed in the same way as specified below. 
For custom devices, the platform can rely on several 
communication protocols like NSGI, MQTT, COAP and 
AMQP and provide a Snap4City protection system. If NGSI 
is chosen, the IOT Orion Context Broker of Fi-Ware is used, 
with an addition of flexible security layer developed by the 
authors. Since the IOT Orion Broker does not support secure 
connections. In the proposed solution, the first basic 
authorization modality makes use of a couple of keys (K1, 
K2) as credentials, that are automatically generated by the 
Snap4City framework and associated with the device at the 
moment it is registered in the IoT Directory. These credentials 
are made available just to the owner of the IoT Device for 
future inspection. Whenever the IoT Device likes to 
communicate with the Snap4City framework (in case a value 
of a sensor is updated), it simply needs to enrich his 
communication channel with these K1, K2 (credentials) 
beside his identifier (the same apply to any IoT Application 
that like to send a new value to an actuators). These keys have 
to be specified by the user in the configuration of the IoT 
Device/IoT Application.  
An additional set of keys are generated in case the owner 
of the device chose to delegate another user, or group of 
users/organizations/groups, to access the values provided by 
the owned IoT Device/Sensors (in read only modality). 
Whenever the delegation is removed, the K1 and K2 are 
erased and will not be any more valid. When an IoT Device 
has to be declared “Public”, an Anonymous delegation is 
generated. In this later case, the K1, K2 can be and are omitted, 
and reading operation is always permitted. Only the owner is 
enabled to modify the internal status of the device/variables.  
For a higher level of security, the IoT Device owner can 
choose a stronger (in term of security) authentication solution 
based on X.509 certificate. This technique involves the 
exchange of a signed digital certificate, based on a private-
public key cryptography solution. The Snap4City IoT 
Directory acts as security and identity unit using a self-signed 
Certification Authority. The exchanged certificates are 
SSL/TLS based, to ensure secure authentication: the HTTPS 
mutual authentication schema between the device and the 
Snap4City framework is established. When a direct access to 
the device is performed, it is hard to retrieve the private keys 
of the IoT Devices, since it is stored in a key-secure storage 
(SIM card) commonly protected by an additional device 
password. In detail, the complete flow [see Figure 3] implies 
the creation of a private secret when the device is registered in 
the IoT Directory. Later, a digital certificate related to the 
private secret is digitally signed by the Snap4City framework. 
This signed certificate, with the private secret and the 
Snap4City certificate have to be injected in the IoT Device in 
order to establish a mutual authenticated communication 
between the IoT device and the platform. 
A mixed authentication system is also available whenever 
the IoT Device has very low resources and cannot support the 
complete SSL/TLS stack. It relies on K1,K2 authentication 
system plus the ability to verify by the IoT Device the 
Snap4City endpoint using the thumbprint (SHA, SHA3) of 
its public certificate, to establish a secure HTTPS 
communication. 
Fig. 3. Sequence diagram of X509 certificate security enforcement 
C. User Privacy: GDPR and delegation system 
At the moment of the registration, the user is informed 
about which data are collected (mandatory information about 
the user specified in the CRM are needed to enable the service 
and cannot be avoided, due their importance to deliver the 
requested service to the user). Beside this notification, a 
signed consent is requested about the additional set of tracked 
data (Identification of Impact to Personal Data). Optional 
data information can be updated and reviewed via the CRM 
Web Interface. Any time the user can delete his account, 
taking into account that the user’s data will not be made 
available to the user anymore (even if a time-frame is 
guaranteed for police’s officer inspection). 
Whenever the data from a user are injected in the system, 
they are recorded in a MyPersonalData Snap4City module, 
which is a secure storage completely decoupled by any other 
module. The user can review any time the recorded data using 
an authenticated Web Interface and eventually delete any 
recorded data sets or also forget completely any stored data. 
To enable inspection from law enforcement agency the data 
are not immediately deleted: they are marked to be deleted 
after a specific time-frame (usually 30 days). After this time-
frame elapse, the data are completely erased from the system. 
The data marked to be delated are not available to the user, 
and just to the system administrator (Retention of Personal 
Data). 
The stored data in the MyPersonalData module are by 
default set private of the IoT Device/Application owner that 
generated them. Therefore, the data owner is the only one that 
can access for inspection and analysis (beside users with the 
highest role of RootToolAdmin, trusted users’ role granted 
just to system admin and law enforcement agency). The 
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platform permits the users to delegate in access any other user 
or anyone belonging to a specific group/organization. In this 
case, the delegated users have access to read specific 
delegated data. A delegation can be any time reviewed and 
revoked. A delegation can be created by using IoT Directory 
(IoT Device and sensors/actuators), Dashboard Builder (view 
of personal data) and IoT Application manager (user 
generated data). 
A pseudonymization system management and the 
encryption of recorder data are designed by default to prevent 
identification of any specific individuals from compromised 
data in case of a breach events. The Snap4City solution relies 
on a storage where the links between the user’s personal 
information and its data are stored completely decoupled via 
the use of a user’s identifier shared between the 
MyPersonalData storage and the LDAP/Drupal/Keycloak 
modules (Pseudonymization). The data storages are located in 
a set of servers, not directly visible from any external access 
except from a set of authenticated MyPersonalData APIs. The 
Database is protected from external access via “Tablespace 
Encryption”. Tables included in the MyPersonalData DB are 
protected by a set of keys recorded in the database itself. These 
keys are protected by an external Master key, memorized out 
of the database and accessible just by the system 
administrator. Several techniques can be enabled on top of this 
separation (Master key rotation) to provide even more 
required security (Encryption). Any modules of the Snap4City 
framework, that need in some way to access some data for a 
specific user, needs to use the authenticated APIs of the 
MyPersonalData module that eventually authorizes the 
access, if it matches the ownership or the delegation of the 
specific requested data (Access Control). The detailed chain 
of trust of Snap4city platform is highlighted in Figure 4. 
Fig. 4. Chain of trust in Snap4City architecture 
In event of a data breach, the Snap4City framework is able, 
in timely fashion, to detect and report on the issue and also 
generate a set of records of activities performed against the 
data. Monitoring in real-time on different levels of detail is 
possible in the Snap4City framework by the system’s 
administrator, via a system of notifications that mainly employ 
the sending of detailed emails. A set of managements tools are 
also able to constant monitoring the different modules, 
services and databases’ behaviors to proactively mitigate 
risks. A set of thresholds and personal notification’s messages 
can be configured on the different analyzing’s tools 
(Monitoring and reporting). Moreover, any Snap4City 
module is accompanied with an auditing UI, where the 
activities performed on the modules and the requested service 
are graphically displayed for an easy and quickly forensic 
analysis requested by the controller. Some other views on the 
activities on the modules are added for specific purpose, for 
example a complete trace logging of the violation (request 
refused by the module) invoked on the MyPersonalData 
module (Auditing). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The shift of paradigm, from completely central elaboration 
in scenario of Big Data and Smart City towards a more 
distributed computation using a Fog-Cloud model requires 
different approaches in design platform and framework. These 
new Smart City IoT architectures, that can be composed by 
several modules and MicroServices, have to take care by 
design and by default about the privacy and protection of the 
managed data, since in most cases can be very sensitive, due 
to their nature of city data. Different levels of protections have 
to be provided on the basis of the sensitivity of the carried data 
and also different requirements may be defined for different 
use case scenarios (e.g., medical assistance, engineering and 
architecture, entertainment, city risk assessment, city 
resilience), and devices. In this paper, the Snap4City solution 
has been presented: its architecture has been described 
highlighting the components that enabled the platform to 
comply with high security standards and the GDPR of the 
European Commission. The Snap4City solution guarantees an 
end-2-end high level of trust for the current supported 
technologies in terms of security and privacy aspects, 
addressing security in the stack: IOT Devices, IOT Edge, IOT 
Applications, Data Analytics, and Dashboards. 
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